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EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW AS AN 




This contribution explores the evolution of European criminal law through the prism of EU 
constitutional law and its experimental elements. The paper charts the history of European 
criminal law by reflecting on the question of to what degree criminal law as an EU policy 
stands out from the other corners of EU law policies. The paper examines to what extent 
use of EU law sources in the domain of criminal law has been used in an innovative way 
and how, as well as to what extent, it differs from mainstream EU law. Furthermore, the 
paper discusses the issue of enforcement and how the enterprise of EU criminal law could 
possibly be modernized from the perspective of fundamental rights protection. The paper 
concludes by looking at the incoming tide of legislative proposals in the area of EU criminal 
law and how it all adds up to an increased understanding of the AFSJ.
Keywords: EU criminal law; effectiveness; enforcement; experimental; constitutional
§1. INtrODUctION
I have been asked to reflect on the developments of criminal law policies over the 
last 20 years. Therefore, it is likely that the present article stands out from the other 
contributions in this edited collection in that it could be said that EU criminal law stricto 
sensu existed for only about 10 years. In the last decade, the concept of EU criminal law 
has been transformed from being largely of an intergovernmental nature to becoming a 
* Associate Professor of EU Law, centre for European Legal studies and Faculty of Law, VU University 
of Amsterdam. This paper was written during my time as a Visiting Fellow (April-July 2013) in the 
Law Department at the European University Institute, Italy, with the kind support of the Netherlands 
scientific research council (VENI grant). Thanks go to the editors of this special issue for their very 
insightful comments on this piece, with the usual disclaimer.
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streamlined EU policy among others, albeit concerning sensitive nation state questions 
at its core, such as the protection of human rights and national sovereignty. Hence, in the 
last 20 years – the timespan and focus of this Anniversary issue – EU criminal law has 
gone from being a largely anonymous area of law to that of becoming a very dynamic test 
field for the credentials of the EU project and the establishment of the Area of Freedom, 
security and Justice (AFsJ). While sanctions to protect EU interests always played a 
crucial role in the building and maintaining of the internal market, until fairly recently 
it was still at the discretion of the Member states to choose what kind of sanctions to 
impose, as long as the sanctions in question were effective, proportionate and dissuasive.1 
The EU has now created its own criminal law, and this contribution will explore this 
process and what it tells us about the EU integration project in a wider context.
In what follows, I will focus on what I consider to be the most important developments 
in European criminal law, which turned it into one of the most forceful EU policy areas at 
present. I will set out to analyse what have been the main sources of change in this area as 
well as the role played by the general principles of EU law here and the cross-pollination 
of those principles and the principles set out in the EU charter of Fundamental rights. In 
addition the paper will look at to what extent the story of EU criminal law has contributed 
to regulatory innovation for EU governance. In doing so the paper will ask to what extent 
this debate on governance has been reflected in the debate on the enforcement of EU law 
with regard to EU criminal law and procedure.
specifically, the contribution is structured as follows. section 1 offers a brief introduction 
of what it means to discuss EU criminal law in today’s Europe. section 2 offers a brief 
exposé of how EU criminal law came about, firstly by tracing the main Lisbon treaty 
changes and thereafter focusing on the innovative use of EU law principles and how they 
have formed the concept of EU criminal law. section 3 addresses the issue of whether it 
is justifiable to speak about ‘EU regulatory innovation’ with regard to criminal law and 
if the evolution of criminal law could be linked to EU experimentalist governance by 
focusing on the flexibility provisions in particular. Thereafter, section 4 places the role 
of criminal law in the context of the classic enforcement discussion in EU law and the 
debate on its modernization. Finally, section 5 briefly scans recent legislative practice in 
EU criminal law as an illuminating example of the interaction of mainstream EU law 
policies and those pertaining to the AFsJ, and why it represents an important test case of 
EU law and fundamental rights protection when brought together.
before proceeding to look at these issues in further detail it seems fitting to begin by 
briefly setting out what it means to speak about EU criminal law and how we got here in 
the first place.
1 case c-68/88 Commission v. Greece [1989] Ecr 1–02965.
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A. A sNAPsHOt OF tHE AFsJ FrAMEWOrK AND tHE PLAcE OF 
crIMINAL LAW
The policy area of EU criminal law is now situated in title V of the treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (tFEU): Article 67 tFEU sets out the EU’s mission to 
ensure an Area of Freedom, security and Justice (AFsJ) and to combat crime effectively. 
Yet in order to understand the constitutional dynamics underpinning the notion of EU 
criminal law it is necessary to give a short reiteration of what is actually at stake when 
debating its evolution. After all, criminal law was initially of little interest to the EU 
legislator, who was more concerned with the fundamentals of free movement and the 
functioning and establishment of the internal market.2 The area of criminal law was of 
interest to the EU in so far as it was needed to ensure and achieve other economic goals. 
With the Maastricht treaty era starting in 1993, the famous ‘third pillar’ was established, 
which created a separate legal order for criminal law cooperation as well as civil law 
cooperation, and asylum and immigration law. The Amsterdam treaty of 1999 clarified 
the EU’s objectives with regard to the fight against crime and the concept of an AFsJ was 
generated. While asylum matters, immigration and civil law cooperation were moved 
to the former Ec treaty’s title IV, criminal law cooperation and security remained the 
hallmark of the third pillar regime under Amsterdam.3 However, the third pillar allowed 
for limited involvement by the European Parliament in the legislative process and could 
easily be criticized for having created a democratic deficit and for a lack of transparency 
in the law-making.
One of the problems with the third pillar was always the restriction of the court of 
Justice’s jurisdiction. It should be recalled that during the time of the third pillar any 
jurisdiction of the court was based on a voluntary declaration by the Member states to 
confer such jurisdiction (ex Article 35 tEU).4 In tandem with the treaty revisions and 
the creation of the Amsterdam treaty, the tampere council of 1999 took the notion 
of European criminal law one step further by introducing the adoption of the internal 
market formula of ‘mutual recognition’ into the third pillar. The mutual recognition 
formula appeared to be a particularly important theme in the development of EU 
criminal law. The latest European council on AFsJ issues is the stockholm Programme 
which sets out a very ambitious AFsJ scheme. This Programme is important in its 
claim to be serving citizens while at the same time it illuminates a very strong focus on 
security in the current fight against crime and terrorism in the EU.5 The follow up to 
2 E.g. among recent books charting this journey, s. Mettinen, EU Criminal Law Policy (routledge, 
London 2012).
3 see s. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) for an extensive 
overview of the history of the third pillar, chapter 1.
4 Ibid., chapter 2.
5 E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘Is the citizen driving the EU’s criminal law agenda?’, in M. Dougan, N. Nic shuibhne 
and E. spaventa (eds.), Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2012), chapter 9.
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the stockholm Programme with an agenda for 2014–2019 is currently in the making. 
In parallel to these institutional developments, the case law of the court of Justice has 
turned out to be a particularly powerful player in the enterprise of securing a space for 
European criminal law.
The next section will address the question of the extent to which the development 
of EU law has been shaped by innovative sources of EU law. In doing so the paper will 
show that the EU legal principle of effectiveness in its capacity as a multifaceted principle 
has driven this whole area forward, and why understanding the core of this principle is 
crucial for understanding the narrative of EU criminal law.
§2. INNOVAtIVE UsE OF sOUrcEs OF EU LAW: HOW 
cONtEMPOrArY EU crIMINAL LAW cAME AbOUt
criminal law offers an intriguing test case of innovative (as well as traditional) use of the 
EU general principles. Indeed, its very coming into existence at the supranational level 
has been largely thanks to an extensive reading of EU legal principles such as indirect 
effect (Pupino case)6 and the full effectiveness of EU law (Environmental Crimes case),7 
discussed in further detail below. Therefore, the principle of effectiveness played a key 
role here. For this reason, this section will start by providing an overview of just how 
and why the principle of effectiveness shaped the current state of play. It could even be 
argued that the principle of effectiveness has become the main drive in the pursuit of the 
constitutional evolution of European criminal law and this contribution tries to map out 
and thereby paint this pattern. It will do so by placing it in the broader setting of how EU 
criminal law came about.
A. HOW EU crIMINAL LAW DEVELOPED: EArLY DAYs
The phenomenon of EU criminal law developed as a series of parallel developments 
taking shape in the former third and first pillars respectively. In the period pre-Lisbon, 
the assumption was that orthodox principles of EU law did not apply outside the realm of 
the supranational Ec. This assumption was soon to be revised. by now, the Pupino case 
represents one of the ‘classics’ in EU criminal law cooperation and EU constitutional law 
more broadly.8 In Pupino the national court asked the cJEU whether they were required 
to interpret Italian law in the light of a Framework Decision that enabled minors to give 
evidence on alternative means. Third pillar instruments such as framework decisions 
did not have direct effect (according to ex Article 34 EU) and supremacy was not an 
6 case c-105/03 Pupino [2005] Ecr I-05285.
7 case c-176/03 Commission v. Council [2005] Ecr I-07879.
8 case c-105/03 Pupino.
Ester Herlin-Karnell
446 20 MJ 3 (2013)
established notion in the third pillar. Nonetheless, Pupino made it clear that the principle 
of consistent interpretation and loyalty applied to the non-Ec sphere, the former third 
pillar. The outcome of this case started a momentum in EU integration, which has 
seldom been seen. In the wake of the Pupino case a number of judgments were delivered, 
each adding to the understanding of the third pillar and demonstrating how EU legal 
principles were being imported to the former third pillar as a way of fixing problems 
which the unsuccessful constitutional treaty had failed to achieve.9
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) turned out to be a particularly useful test case 
in this regard.10 Notoriously, the EAW replaced the traditional extradition procedures 
with ones securing ‘surrender’ in accordance with the theme of mutual recognition and 
where the previous requirement of dual criminality was abolished. The purpose of the 
EAW was to speed up criminal law cooperation and to fight terrorism more effectively. 
In short, the EAW litigation saga started with an assumption that mutual trust was the 
prevailing condition for upholding the legality of the EAW.11 Advocaten voor de Wereld12 
was the first test case on the validity of the EAW that was brought before the court of 
Justice. Advocaten voor de Wereld was a non-profit making association that started a 
claim in belgium for annulment of the EAW Framework Decision. One of the questions 
asked by the national court13 was whether the EAW and its abolishment of dual 
criminality breached the principle of legality in criminal law. This judgment insisted that 
the underlying idea of the EAW and the rule to abolish the notion of dual criminality 
did not breach the principle of legality since the Framework Decision was concerned 
with procedural law and not substantive law. According to the court of Justice, the main 
reason for such a conclusion was the high degree of trust and solidarity between the 
Member states.14
In these early days the court sought to establish a European criminal law grid based 
on mutual trust as the managing principle for mutual recognition. The notion of trust 
in this area has in many ways worked as a panacea for a lack of uniformity and for 
9 Many commentators have written on this phenomenon, see e.g. s. Peers, ‘salvation outside the church: 
Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar after the Pupino and segi Judgments’, 44 Common Market Law 
Review 4 (2007), p. 883; A. Hinarejos, Judicial control in the European Union: reforming jurisdiction in 
the intergovernmental pillars (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009).
10 council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member states, [2002] OJ L 190/1.
11 Among the many commentators, e.g. V. Mitsilegas, ‘The constitutional Implications of Mutual 
recognition in criminal Matters in the EU’, 43 Common Market Law Review 5 (2006), p.  1277; 
c. rijken, ‘re-balancing security and Justice: Protection of Fundamental rights in Police and Judicial 
cooperation in criminal Matters’,47 Common Market Law Review 5 (2010), p. 1455; s. Peers, EU Justice 
and Home Affairs, chapter 9; M. Fichera, The implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the 
European Union Law, Policy and Practice (Intersentia, Antwerp 2011).
12 case c-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] Ecr I-03633.
13 The other questions asked were whether the EAW should have been adopted as a convention rather 
than as a Framework Decision and whether the EAW breached the principles of equality and non-
discrimination.
14 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, cheltenham 2009), p. 138–142.
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subverting obstacles to the operation of the EAW by insisting on sufficient trust as a driver 
of integration. Yet, and perhaps needless to say, the strong emphasis on trust created by 
the court, where mutual recognition was pushed forward without an adequate system of 
underlying fundamental rights protection, was highly problematic and not in harmony 
with the EU rule of law.
b. LIsbON cHANgEs: INstItUtIONAL trANsFOrMAtION
The Lisbon treaty reshuffled the constitutional setting for how to understand EU criminal 
law, firstly by establishing a legal basis (in title V of the tFEU) and secondly by abolishing 
the third pillar and thereby ‘communitarizing’ the sphere of the AFsJ. A great deal has 
been written about this constitutionalization process, and the present contribution will 
therefore not repeat this important journey.15 It should however be pointed out that for 
criminal law, the crucial provisions are Articles 82 tFEU (procedural criminal law) and 
83 tFEU (substantive criminal law). These provisions, however, need to be read in the 
light of chapter I of title V of tFEU, which sets out the general goals to be achieved in 
this area. More specifically, Article 67 tFEU stipulates, inter alia, that the Union shall 
constitute an AFsJ with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems 
and traditions of the Member states. so the project of EU criminal law is part of a bigger 
venture to establish an AFsJ. Of particular importance here is Article 83(1) tFEU, which 
concerns the regulation of substantive criminal law. It stipulates that the European 
Parliament and the council may establish minimum rules in directives concerning the 
definition of criminal law offences and sanctions in the area of particularly serious crime 
with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences; or 
from a special need to combat them on a common basis. Thereafter, this provision sets 
out a list of crimes in respect of which the EU shall have legislative competence, such as 
terrorism, organised crime, money laundering, counterfeiting of means of payment, and 
computer related crime. It also states that the council may identify other possible areas 
of crime that meet the cross-border and seriousness criteria. Furthermore, Article 83(2) 
establishes that the possibility exists for approximation of national laws if a measure 
proves to be essential towards ensuring the effective implementation of a Union policy in 
an area that has already been subject to harmonization measures.
Apart from the abolition of the third pillar as well as the specific EU competences 
in criminal law, there are several important novelties that need to be considered. For 
example, the emergency brake provisions (where Member states can pull a brake if the 
proposed legislation is sensitive to the national criminal law system), and the notion of 
expedited procedures for persons in custody. Article 267 tFEU provides that if a question 
15 E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2012), chapter 2; V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law; s. Mettinen, EU Criminal Law Policy (routledge, 
London 2012).
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is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal in a Member state with regard to a 
person in custody, the court of Justice of the European Union shall act with minimum 
delay.16 That said, the court of Justice’s jurisdiction to govern the former third pillar 
introduced by the Lisbon treaty does not extend unreservedly. For example the court 
still does not have the power to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried 
out by the police or other law enforcement agencies of a Member state, or the exercise of 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member states with regard to the maintenance of law 
and order, and the safeguarding of internal security (Article 276 tFEU).
This section will now turn to the most obvious use of innovative sources of EU law 
in the context of contemporary EU criminal law: that of the use of the effectiveness 
principle as the leading principle in this area.
c. EU crIMINAL LAW IN tHE brOADEr cONtExt: UsE OF 
EFFEctIVENEss
This subsection demonstrates the various ways that the effectiveness principle has been 
used in EU criminal law.17 In particular, it seeks to demonstrate the force of this principle 
and how much of the development of EU criminal law has been shaped by the unusually 
broad contours of ‘effectiveness’ reasoning. The classic principle of effectiveness is 
often held to stem from the more general loyalty obligation, Article 4(3) tEU (formerly 
Article 10 Ec), and has played a crucial role in shaping the contours of the effectiveness 
of EU law.18 For example, the doctrines of indirect effect, state liability, and supremacy 
are also embedded with ‘effectiveness’ thinking.19 In addition, the Lisbon treaty has 
introduced an explicit legal basis for effective judicial protection, so use of the principle 
of effectiveness in the area of judicial protection is more legally settled. This is the new 
provision of Article  19 tEU which codifies existing case law and states that Member 
states shall provide sufficient remedies to ensure effective legal protection in the fields 
covered by EU law. In addition, Article 47 of the EU charter of Fundamental rights (‘the 
charter’) states that everyone has the right to an effective remedy. Therefore, it seems 
clear that the contextualization is the important aspect here and where the effective 
function of EU law might differ a lot depending on the policy area in question, and where 
criminal law appears particularly delicate.
16 The procedure is governed by Article 23a of the Protocol on the statute of the court of Justice and 
Article 104b of its rules of Procedure.
17 see E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law, ch. 4.
18 For an overview, e.g. J. temple Lang, ‘The Developments of the court of Justice on the Duties of 
cooperation of National Authorities and community Institutions Under Article 10 Ec’, 31 Fordham 
Int’l L.J 6 (2008), p. 1483.
19 P. craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012); case c-106/89 Marleasing 
[1990] Ecr I-04135.
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Against the backdrop of the broader framework of European law, the question 
that needs to be asked is to what extent ‘effectiveness’ is more than a mere assertion of 
supremacy and why it is different in EU criminal law from more classic areas of European 
law. Indeed, effectiveness has been given many expressions in EU law and criminal law, 
and offers an excellent example of the elasticity of this concept.
1. Different shades of effectiveness: the legacy of the Environmental Crimes case
The principle of effectiveness has in many ways been the driving principle for the 
evaluation of EU criminal law. The story of the environmental crimes case, case 
c-176/03, is interesting, and started with an initiative by Denmark for a proposal for 
a Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through criminal law.20 
The commission did not agree and made a proposal for a directive that would oblige 
Member states to take criminal law action for the protection of the environment.21 This 
Directive was noteworthy because it challenged the previous assumption that the EU 
has no legislative competence in the field of criminal law. In the context of a challenge 
against the validity of the Directive, the court of Justice made it clear that:
when the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the 
competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious environmental 
offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member states which 
it considers necessary in order to ensure that rules which it lays down on environmental 
protection are fully effective.
so a lot of weight was loaded onto the full effectiveness of the EU when asserting the EU’s 
competence.22 In the subsequent Ship Source Pollution case23 the court confirmed this 
view but left the level of the penalty to be applied for the Member states to decide, as it fell 
outside of the EU’s competence. As noted above, the EU had of course, early on, insisted 
on effective sanctions against breaches of EU law (the effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criteria stipulated in Greek Maize and other cases),24 but in the Environmental 
Crimes case, the EU legislator concluded that criminal law could fall within the EU 
sphere of competence if it was necessary for the full effectiveness of EU law.
20 Framework Decision on combating environmental crime, [2000] 383/JHA, OJ L39/4.
21 Proposal for a Directive on the Protection of the Environment through criminal Law, [2001] OJ c 
180/238 and amended proposal, [2003] OJ c 20/284.
22 relevant here was also ex Article 47 tEU that stated that if something could be done by the first pillar 
it should be done by that pillar.
23 Ship Source Pollution case concerning Directive 2005/35/Ec of the European Parliament and 
of the council of 7  september 2005 on ship-source pollution and the introduction of penalties for 
infringement, [2005] OJ L 255/11, based on Article 80(2) Ec, and amended by Directive 2009/123/Ec 
of the European Parliament and of the council on 21 October 2009 amending Directive 2005/35/Ec on 
ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, [2009] OJ L 280/52.
24 case c-68/88 Commission v. Greece [1989] Ecr I-02965, para. 24.
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a. Effectiveness and mutual recognition
In the recent case of Da Silva Jorge, the court of Justice stretched the reach of the classic 
effectiveness test to the EAW cases.25 In the Da Silva Jorge case the full effectiveness of EU 
law played an important role where the court of Justice emphasized the importance of it 
as a pre-condition of the operation of the EAW. Particularly, the court stated that where 
an EU legal act calls for national implementing measures, national authorities and courts 
remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided 
that the level of protection provided for by the charter, as interpreted by the court, and 
the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised.26 Moreover 
in Melloni,27 on the validity of the amendments made to the EAW,28 the court of 
Justice held that an overly broad interpretation of the EU charter of Fundamental rights 
(Article 53), with the effect of granting extra rights and thereby safeguarding national 
constitutions, would not only undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law but also 
the effectiveness of EU law. Hence, the principle of effectiveness is a powerful tool, which 
does not seem to fade away that easily.
When discussing effectiveness in EU criminal law, an obvious question is to what 
extent it represents something new at all? In other words, could one see a similar 
pattern in other corners of EU law? The frequent use of effectiveness in everyday EU 
law vocabulary is far from new. The principle of ‘effectiveness’ as referred to by the 
court is an umbrella term, which, generally speaking, requires that national remedies 
and procedural rules must not, in practice, render their beneficiaries’ enjoyment of 
community rights excessively difficult.29
The argument here is that ‘effectiveness’ is used slightly differently in EU criminal law, 
where it has been utilized not only to enforce existing EU legislation but also to ‘discover’ 
new competences. some would argue that this has turned the principle of effectiveness 
into a constitutional competence-parameter for deciding the EU’s competence in the first 
place. such an argument goes hand in hand with the view that over-use of effectiveness is 
dangerous as there are not many constraints in place when trying to monitor its reach.30
25 case c-42/11 Joao Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge, Judgment of 5 september 2012, not yet reported; for 
an analysis E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘From Mutual trust to the Full Effectiveness of EU law: 10 Years of the 
European Arrest Warrant’, 38 European Law Review 1 (2013), p. 79-91.
26 case c-399/11, Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni, Judgment of 26 February 2013, not yet 
reported, para. 60.
27 Opinion of Advocate general bot in case c-399/11 Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni.
28 council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Decision 2002/584/JHA 
enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at trial, [2009] OJ L 81/24.
29 similarly, see M. Accetto and s. Zleptnig, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness: rethinking Its role in 
community Law’, 11 European Public Law 3 (2011), p. 375; M. ross, ‘Effectiveness in the European 
Legal Order(s): beyond supremacy to constitutional Proportionality’, 31 ELRev 4 (2006), p. 476.
30 E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law.
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b. Effectiveness concern and anti-money laundering legislation
The recent ruling in Jyske Bank represents a ‘mixed’ example of use of criminal law 
and old-fashioned market integration based on effectiveness concerns.31 The question 
posed to the court of Justice was whether spain’s interpretation of the Third Money 
Laundering Directive32 was going too far. The Directive is based on the internal market 
provision of Article 114 tFEU as well as on the services provision of Article 56 tFEU. 
Jyske bank, a Danish credit institution based in gibraltar, operated in spain under the 
rules on the freedom to provide services. It challenged the spanish law implementing 
the Third Money Laundering Directive on the basis of (in effect) ‘gold plating’ or over-
implementation in spanish law of the Money Laundering Directive. The Directive requires 
each Member state to establish a central financial intelligence unit (FIU) responsible 
for receiving, analysing and disseminating information to the competent authorities on 
potential money laundering or terrorist financing. In addition, the Directive provides 
for that information to be forwarded to the FIU of the Member state in whose territory 
the institution is situated. Yet spanish legislation required that all information was 
gathered in spain regardless of where the institution in question was legally located. 
Jyske challenged this on the basis of the free movement of services.
The court in its recent judgment again focused on the effectiveness of the EU 
measure. It held in paragraph 49 of the ruling that the Directive:
could not preclude Member states legislation which requires credit institutions carrying out 
activities in its territory under the rules on the freedom to provide services to forward the 
required information directly to its own FIU, in so far as such legislation seeks to strengthen, in 
compliance with European Union law, the effectiveness of the fight against money laundering 
and terrorist financing.
The court added however that the effectiveness of the measure in question could not be 
disproportionate. It is a judgment on the borderline of criminal law and internal market 
law, and confirms the importance – or fashion – of the principle of effectiveness as a key 
principle which unites competing interests. Accordingly, the principle of effectiveness in 
EU criminal law has come a long way from its simple assertion of dissuasive, effective 
and proportionate sanctions to protect EU law interests.33 It is argued that ‘effectiveness’ 
as indicated in the area of criminal law has developed to a chameleonic principle and that 
it finds expression not only as an enforcement principle, but also as a legislative principle 
for deciding on competence in EU law. In addition it forms part of the court of Justice’s 
reading into and insistence on mutual trust.
31 case c-212/11 Jyske bank, Judgment of 16 April 2013, not yet reported.
32 Directive 2005/60/Ec of the European Parliament and of the council of 26  October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, [2005] OJ L 309/15.
33 case c-68/88 Commission v. Greece [1989] Ecr I-2965.
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Whilst acknowledging and asserting the general effectiveness ratio in this area, the 
present paper moves on to investigate to what extent criminal law at the EU level fits the 
emerging pattern of constitutional ‘experimentalism’ in EU law.34
§3. rEgULAtOrY INNOVAtION? EU crIMINAL LAW As 
A tEst cAsE IN ‘ExPErIMENtALIsM’
This section will try to place the above developments in context and assess to what 
extent the concept of EU criminal law/and the AFsJ more broadly can be said to 
represent experimentalist governance. For one thing, criminal law represents expressive 
governance in that it implies a symbolic statement by the legislator that some conduct 
is wrong and thereby penalized.35 While the function of the EU as a norm exporter 
to the Member states is far from new and formed part of how much of EU law was 
developed, its involvement in criminal law is still embryonic. Yet allowing the EU to 
claim a ‘symbolic’ role in criminal law would arguably be a step too far in the current 
state of play. There is a clear lacuna with regard to the democratic credentials in the AFsJ, 
and where notions such as citizenship and state liability will improve individuals’ rights 
but where the legitimacy is still a work in progress.
The present section will focus on the concepts of flexibility and differentiation in 
the context of EU criminal law and try to link these notions to the recent debate on EU 
governance and alternative readings of EU law such as the experimental model in EU 
law. Indeed, the enhanced cooperation mechanisms as well as the challenges caused by 
the tangled web of what could be labelled as ‘flexibility’ offer an interesting example of 
regulatory practice in EU criminal law. Arguably it represents new governance despite 
its limited ‘newness’.36 However the question of what is – and should be – considered as 
‘good governance’ or what is truly ‘reflective’ and ‘experimental’ governance is a difficult 
one.37 According to Kumm, an experimentalist understanding of EU constitutional 
law can be deducted from that of the flourishing theories of pluralism in EU law.38 It 
means that there may be alternative ways of understanding EU law and that that very 
understanding may insist on the provision of national identity, where Article 4(2) tEU 
34 see J. Zeitlin and c. sabel, Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New 
Architecture (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010).
35 see J. turner, ‘The Expressive Dimension of EU criminal law’, 60 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law (2012), p. 555.
36 E.g. K. Armstrong, ‘Law after Lisbon: Legalization and Delegalization of European governance’, 64 
Current Legal Problems 1 (2011).
37 see E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘Enhanced cooperation and conflicting Values: Are New Forms of governance 
the same as good governance?’, in E. Herlin-Karnell, M. trybus and L. rubini (eds.) After Lisbon: The 
Impact of the New Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, cheltenham 2012).
38 M. Kumm, ‘constitutionalism and experimentalist governance’, 6 Regulation and Governance 3 (2012), 
p. 401.
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is a key aspect for successful management of the European process. Indeed, a novelty 
as offered by the Lisbon treaty is the national (and constitutional) identity clause as 
set out in Article 4(2) tEU. Arguably, this national identity clause is connected to the 
subsidiarity principle, as it insists on respecting Member state values.
In the setting of EU criminal law, the expression of ‘experientialism’ is perhaps most 
evident in the landscape of flexibility or differentiation in EU law. The notion of flexibility 
or differentiation is generally described as the facilitation or accommodation of a degree 
of difference between states or regions in relation to what would otherwise be ‘common’ 
Union rules.39 In any case, the general rule is that the commission and the council 
give their permission for enhanced cooperation to take place within the framework of 
the Lisbon treaty. However, in the criminal law field there is no need to fulfil the last 
resort requirement as the Lisbon treaty provides possibilities of establishing ‘automatic’ 
enhanced cooperation in criminal law should nine Member states wish to move further 
than the Member state(s) which pulled the ‘emergency brake’. As will be explained 
below, there is a possibility for Member states, as set out in Articles 82–83 tFEU to pull 
an ‘emergency brake’ – or quasi opt-out – if the legislation in question would interfere 
with fundamental aspects of the national criminal law system at issue. Arguably the 
establishment of enhanced cooperation within title V Part I of the tFEU raises many 
questions as it emphasizes conflicting rationalities in this area between moving forward 
and restraining action. The next section of this contribution will attempt to explain why.
An example of differentiation in criminal law is the emergency brake provisions and 
the enhanced cooperation mechanisms as provided by Articles 82 and 83 tFEU.
EMErgENcY brAKEs AND FLExIbILItY IN A MULtI-sPEED EUrOPE
In the context of EU criminal law, the question of enhanced cooperation is tied to 
the ‘emergency brake’ provisions. Enhanced cooperation under the Lisbon treaty 
means that some Member states can choose to establish a closer cooperation between 
themselves and is set out in Article  20 tEU and Articles  326–334 tFEU, regrouping 
the previous four sets of rules on enhanced cooperation into two groups.40 Thus, the 
general framework is set out in the tEU while the tFEU sets out the specific criteria 
and details. Hence, the tEU and tFEU have to be read in conjunction when analysing 
the possibilities of the establishment of enhanced cooperation. In short, Articles 82 and 
83 tFEU respectively permit Member states to ‘apply the brakes’ if the legislation in 
question would affect fundamental aspects of their criminal law legislation. regardless 
of whether a single Member state pulls such an ‘emergency brake’, the Lisbon treaty 
39 g. de búrca, ‘Legal Principles as an Instrument of Differentiation?’, in b. de Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos 
(eds.), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Intersentia, Antwerp 2003), p. 131.
40 J.-c. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (cambridge University Press, cambridge 
2010).
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provides nonetheless for the possibility of enhanced cooperation for the remaining nine 
(or more) Member states. Articles 82 and 83 tFEU of the Lisbon treaty respectively, 
state:
In case of disagreement, and if at least nine Member states wish to establish enhanced 
cooperation on the basis of the draft directive concerned, they shall notify the European 
Parliament, the council and the commission accordingly. In such a case, the authorisation 
to proceed with enhanced cooperation referred to in Article 20(2) of the treaty on European 
Union and Article 329 of this treaty shall be deemed to be granted and the provisions on 
enhanced cooperation shall apply.
briefly, this means that there is no obligation as set out in Article 329 tFEU of the Lisbon 
treaty to address a request to the commission, specifying the scope and objectives of the 
enhanced cooperation in question. Neither is there an obligation (as Article 20(2) tFEU 
of the Lisbon treaty reads) that the council shall, as a last resort, adopt the decision 
at issue. In addition, there is no obligation to consult the European Parliament. I have 
previously argued that the mere fact that the Member states do not need to show the 
last resort requirement as stated in Article 20(2) tFEU could be regarded as not being 
in harmony with the sensitive character of criminal law as the ultimo ratio, where EU 
criminal law appears a primo ratio, id est, a short cut solution without any underlying 
criminal law policy.
Perhaps this worry was overemphasized: so far there has been no establishment 
of enhanced cooperation in EU criminal law, despite the high amount of legislative 
proposals that are currently being drafted (the ordinary legislative procedure being 
one of the novelties in the AFsJ as a result of Lisbon). Nonetheless, in other areas the 
occurrence of enhanced cooperation is slowly taking shape.
recently, enhanced cooperation was granted in the area of unitary patent. such an 
authorization was challenged in Spain and Italy v. Council.41 The question was whether 
a unitary patent fell within the exclusive competence of the Union or if it was a shared 
one. Only shared competences may be the subject of closer cooperation. The decision 
was challenged on the ground that a unitary patent was not a matter governed by the 
shared competence of the Union, which is one of the criteria for relying on Article 20(2) 
tEU and Article 326 tFEU. However, the court upheld the decision to establish closer 
cooperation.42 In doing so, the court made it clear that by creating a unitary patent 
applicable in the participating Member states only (while being open to all Member 
states) and not in the EU, the contested decision did not damage the internal market or 
the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU. Arguably this demonstrates a low 
threshold for the Member states wishing to establish such cooperation. It is likely that, 
41 Joined cases c-274/11 and c-295/11 Spain and Italy v. Council, Judgment of 16  April 2013, not yet 
reported.
42 Ibid.
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should enhanced cooperation be granted in criminal law in future, the threshold will be 
even lower bearing in mind that such an authorization in criminal law is ‘automatic’, id 
est, granted directly.
Opting in and opting out: a challenge to established regulatory practice
The UK and Irish opt-out is one of the hottest topics in AFsJ law as these Member states 
have negotiated a unique approach to the AFsJ project which in essence means a pick and 
choose approach. The opt-out regime poses challenges in particular for the court of Justice 
when asked to monitor EU constitutional principles in this area. specifically, the UK and 
Ireland have the opportunity to opt out of any criminal law cooperation measure concluded 
within the framework of the AFsJ as stipulated in Protocol No. 21 of the Lisbon treaty. 
Needless to say, this is bound to be a political decision and will be the cause of further 
complexity in the legal discussion of the AFsJ. Future case law must clarify what this tells 
us with regard to the scope of the charter of Fundamental rights. The position of Denmark 
in particular, and Protocol No. 22, appears to be even more challenging. Denmark offers 
an exceptional test case for the feasibility of the AFsJ project when some Member states 
remain outside. More concretely, Protocol No. 22, attached to the Lisbon treaty, grants 
Denmark a special position by granting it the right to remain outside the project. This 
Protocol means that Denmark participates in schengen related measures and pre-Lisbon 
third pillar instruments on the basis of international law which continue to be binding and 
applicable to Denmark as before, even if these acts are amended. Denmark may however 
notify the other Member states that it wishes to join the EU criminal law venture.
It remains to be seen to what extent the court of Justice will develop the principles 
as recognized in the charter to cover situations where the UK has opted out. The most 
intriguing example would be that of legal safeguards. After all, Articles  47–50 of the 
charter, which guarantees not only effective judicial protection but also compliance 
with the principle of legality and so on, could be interpreted as a codification of general 
principles of EU law and hence applicable to the area at stake regardless of any opt out. 
Arguably, the opt-out area offers a fascinating yet complicated test case of just what 
constitutional principles apply and how they work in the AFsJ. The opt-out area and 
the concept of a multi-speed Europe is a delicate testing ground of the emerging and 
divergent field of the AFsJ policy field, and the scope and function of the classic EU 
constitutional principles to this area.43 given that the main theme within EU criminal 
43 For a recent analysis, E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘Denmark and the European Area of Freedom, security and 
Justice: A scandinavian Arrangement’, Amsterdam Law Forum (2013), p. 95. For an early analysis of 
differentiation D. curtin, ‘The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe of bits and Pieces’, 30 
Common Market Law Review 1 (1993), p. 17.
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law cooperation is still mutual recognition, it could be argued that the opt-outs pose a 
real challenge to the credibility of the EU project and the striving for consistency.44
In conclusion, the area of EU criminal law offers a delicate albeit good test case of 
experimentalism in terms of innovation in EU constitutional law, and perhaps more 
importantly, in EU legal practice. The innovative use of the principle of effectiveness 
aside, it was argued that the notion of differentiation and the function of the emergency 
brake as well as the complex opt out provisions offer examples of an alternative model 
of EU integration not based on the traditional one-size-fits-all model of harmonization. 
Moreover, the debate on innovative use of EU law is obviously connected to the discussion 
on how to modernize enforcement of EU law.
§4. KEY DEbAtEs ON HOW tO MODErNIZE ENFOrcEMENt 
IN EU crIMINAL LAW
There has been surprisingly little debate in EU criminal law on to how to modernize 
its enforcement. to the extent that there has been such a discussion, the debate on 
enforcement in the EU criminal law setting has been very focused on the stockholm 
Programme’s agenda45 and the stipulation of the future objective of the EU in this 
area and the importance of the creation of trust in the AFsJ as well as the instance on 
security dominated measures.46 However, it could be argued that enforcement in this 
context has not, as in the classic EU law domain, been concerned with individual rights 
in national courts but rather on the enforcement of coercive measures in the name of 
security concerns. A crucial task for the future is consequently to modernize the current 
model of enforcement in making sure that not only the security agenda is being pursued 
in accordance with Article 67 tEU and the EU’s ambition to maintain a high level of 
security but also to make sure that individual rights are respected in this European 
process of establishing an AFsJ and where criminal law plays a key role.
The commission’s recent communication ‘towards an EU criminal Policy: Ensuring 
the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law’ is particularly 
interesting as it offers a concrete example of a nuanced debate in the EU institutions 
44 For a more extensive analysis, E. Herlin-Karnell and t. Konstadinides, ‘The rise and Expressions of 
consistency in EU Law: Legal and strategic Implications for European Integration’, 15 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2013), forthcoming.
45 council of the European Union, The stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving 
and protecting the citizen, brussels 2  December 2009, www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.26419!menu/
standard/file/Klar_stockholmsprogram.pdf (last visited 20 June 2010).
46 On enforcement and EU criminal law, M. Dougan, ‘From the Velvet glove to the Iron Fist: criminal 
sanctions for the Enforcement of Union Law’, in M. cremona, Compliance and the Enforcement of EU 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012).
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in the sphere of EU criminal law.47 This communication explicitly mentions not only 
the need to develop a coherent system of EU criminal law policy, but also highlights the 
concerns of EU citizens. Part of the justification for this communication is, therefore, 
the added value of EU criminal law, in line with the wishes of the EU citizens. It seems 
clear that the enforceability of the charter plays an important role in the context of 
the rights of the citizens. For this reason this section will focus on recent developments 
in EU criminal law enforcement by discussing the reach of the charter with regard to 
fundamental rights protection in this area.
ENFOrcINg tHE cHArtEr? MELLONI, ÅkEBERG FRANSSON AND 
ALL tHAt
This section will focus on a number of recent cases where the question of modernized 
enforcement in EU criminal law seems inexorably linked to the charter of Fundamental 
rights. It is here that the enforcement of EU law in criminal law matters is put to the test. 
At the outset it should be reiterated that the charter applies to the EU institutions and 
to the Member states when they implement EU law, in accordance with Article 51 of the 
charter. Nonetheless, the charter has always had an important function as a source of 
interpretation in EU law. As for criminal law, Articles 47 to 49 of the charter have a huge 
influence, as they set the framework for the EU’s action in this area. It is, therefore, likely 
that the binding status of the charter will have a real impact on criminal law. It could, 
therefore, be argued that the charter not only underlines and clarifies the legal status 
and freedoms of the EU’s citizens facing the institutions of the Union,48 but also gives the 
Union and, in particular, the policies regarding the AFsJ, a new normative foundation. 
Yet, one difficulty with the charter is its enforcement, and indeed the legitimacy of it, in 
those cases where it is not so obvious that we are dealing with implementation of EU law.
A recent example of use of the charter in the context of sanctions is the recent case 
of Åkerberg Fransson concerning the compatibility with the ne bis in idem (Article 50 of 
the charter) principle of a national system involving two separate sets of proceedings 
to sanction the same wrongful conduct.49 Advocate general cruz Villalόn stated in his 
Opinion that Article 50 of the charter did not preclude the Member states from bringing 
criminal proceedings relating to facts in respect of which a final penalty has already 
been imposed in administrative proceedings relating to the same conduct, provided that 
the national criminal court was in a position to take into account the prior existence of 
47 communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the council, the European 
Economic and social committee and the committee of the regions, towards an EU criminal Policy: 
Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law, cOM (2011) 573 final.
48 I. Pernice, ‘The treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental rights’, in s. griller and Z. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon 
Treaty EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (springer, New York 2008), p. 235.
49 case c-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, Judgment of 26 February 2013, not yet reported.
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an administrative penalty for the purposes of mitigating.50 The court of Justice in turn 
did not elaborate on this aspect of proportionality, but adopted a very broad reading 
of the charter.51 It held that although the national rules in questions did not stricto 
sensu involve any implementation, it was clear from Article 325 tFEU that the Member 
states are required to fight fraud against the EU and thereby supply the same level of 
sanctions for EU fraud and domestic fraud respectively. Moreover, such an obligation 
could be deducted from the general obligations to punish tax fraud as stemming from 
the VAt Directive (2006/112/Ec).52 From this it followed, according to the court, that 
sweden was ‘implementing’ EU law as it was under an established obligation to supply 
the same level of penalties for EU fraud and domestic fraud respectively. besides, the 
court observed that EU law precludes a judicial practice which makes the obligation for 
a national court to disapply any provision contrary to a fundamental right guaranteed 
by the charter conditional upon that infringement being clear from the text of the 
charter or the case law relating to it. According to the court such an interpretation 
would withhold from the national court the power to assess fully whether that provision 
in question is compatible with the charter.53 On the one hand the court constructed a 
very narrow definition of ne bis in idem. On the other hand it expands the reach of the 
charter, which could have important repercussions for the future of fundamental rights 
protection in EU law.
In the recent decision of Stefano Melloni,54 on the validity of the amendments made 
to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA,55 and 
addressing the application of the principle of mutual recognition to trial in absentia, 
Advocate general bot provided an interesting account of the relationship between 
the EAW and the charter of Fundamental rights. The Advocate general focused on 
Article 53 of the charter, which provides for the highest relevant human rights standard 
to be applied. In doing so, he argued that the charter is not, in any event, a primacy-
restricting measure and does not empower the Member states to ‘opt-out’ from EU 
law. The court of Justice agreed and held that such an interpretation of Article 53 of 
the charter would undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law. specifically, the 
court stated that where an EU legal act calls for national implementing measures, 
national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of 
fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the charter, 
as interpreted by the court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not 
50 Opinion of Advocate general cruz Villalόn in case c-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson.
51 Ibid.
52 case c-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, para. 27–28.
53 Ibid., para. 48.
54 Opinion of Advocate general bot in case c-399/11 Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni.
55 council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA.
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thereby compromised.56 Without guessing too wildly, it seems safe to predict that this 
area is set for important developments in the future.
Furthermore, in the Radu case Advocate general sharpston went as far as suggesting 
that the charter should constitute the template for deciding on the scope of mutual 
recognition.57 According to Advocate general sharpston, the attribution of binding 
force to the charter is an expression of a political move towards enhancing the visibility 
of human rights and merely confirms the human-rights oriented approach which had 
already been enshrined in the Framework Decision in question (the EAW in this case) 
prior to the entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon.58 The court of Justice in its recent 
judgment did not elaborate on this aspect either.59 Accordingly, while mutual recognition 
plays a key role in the establishment of an AFsJ it is no longer a blind insistence of mutual 
trust, but such trust has to fit within what is acceptable from a fundamental rights 
perspective.
An important issue in the present context is the exact impact of the principle 
of proportionality to these cases. As noted above, the charter is addressed to the 
EU institutions and the Member states when they are implementing Union law.60 
Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the charter will have a wider impact 
in the area of EU criminal law. It could be argued that it is exactly in this balancing 
exercise of new legislation that the charter has a huge impact when deciding on the 
content of new legislation.61 Nevertheless, future cases must clarify to what extent it is 
desirable to extend the scope of the charter and increase rights against the possible will 
of the Member states. As explained above, the development of EU criminal law has so 
far mostly been concerned with the insistence on effectiveness. In future, the principle 
of proportionality will perhaps take over as a driving principle in this area by balancing 
that of the Member states’ interests and the obligations set by the charter.
The final section of this contribution will turn to two concrete areas in EU criminal 
law: that of financial crimes and procedural safeguards. This section seeks to demonstrate 
the force of EU criminal law in legal practice.
56 case c-399/11 Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni, para. 60.
57 Opinion of Advocate general sharpston in case c-396/11 Radu, Judgment of 29 January 2013, not yet 
reported.
58 Ibid.
59 case c-396/11 Radu.
60 For an overview see M. Dougan, ‘The treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’, 45 CMLRev 
3 (2008), p. 617.
61 see E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law.
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§5. tHE INcOMINg tIDE OF LEgIsLAtIVE PrOPOsALs: 
FINANcIAL crIMEs AND LEgIsLAtION FOr 
PrOcEDUrAL sAFEgUArDs
As explained, the Lisbon treaty has significantly changed the structure of the allocation 
of powers between the EU and the Member states with regard to EU criminal law. 
Article  83(2) tFEU appears particularly important as it provides for criminal law 
legislation in an area which has already been subject to the EU’s harmonization 
programme – if it is essential for the effective implementation of an EU policy. It is 
argued that it represents a codification of the case c-176/03 approach, that criminal law 
can be harmonized in order to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law.62 The proposal 
for a directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation is 
instructive as the first concrete example of the use of Article 83(2) tFEU.63 The proposed 
Directive argues that market integrity is needed for the smooth functioning of the 
internal market. Accordingly, it seems as if the same EU legislative justifications are 
at work here, such as regarding the market rationale and the need for harmonization 
in criminal law that are often used under Article 114 tFEU.64 The proposed Directive 
creates a new framework for the purposes of fighting crime while it regroups the 
previous market abuse regime into a separate regulation to increase the effectiveness of 
the system. The proposed Directive is a prime example of the invocation of criminal law 
to guarantee the effectiveness of European policies in this area.65 Hence, there is reason 
to believe that the court will take at face value the claims of the EU legislator just as it 
has done in the internal market context.66
A. cONFIscAtION OF PrOcEEDs OF crIMEs
A further recent example of activity in the field of substantive criminal law legislation 
at the EU level is the recent proposal for a directive on the confiscation of the proceeds 
of crimes.67 The aim of this proposal is to make it easier for Member states’ authorities 
to confiscate and recover the profits which criminals make from serious and organized 
cross-border crime. Interestingly the proposal is based on both Articles 82(2) and 83(1) 
62 see §2.c above.
63 Proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, cOM 
(2011) 654 final; Proposal for a regulation on Insider Dealing and Market manipulation, cOM (2011) 
651 final.
64 s. Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonisation ten Years after tobacco Advertising: How the 
court’s case law has become a “drafting guide”’, 12 German Law Journal (2011), p. 827.
65 see E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘White-collar crime and European Financial crises: getting tough on EU 
Market Abuse’, 37 European Law Review 2 (2012), p. 487.
66 s. Weatherill, 12 German Law Journal (2011), p. 827.
67 Proposal for a Directive on the freezing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime in the EU, cOM 
(2012) 36 final.
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of the tFEU. Article 82(2) makes it clear that any legislation adopted under this provision 
must aim to facilitate mutual recognition. With this requirement it is perhaps difficult 
to see how the proposal in question facilitates mutual recognition. The reason why the 
commission might have chosen this dual approach with regard to legal basis is perhaps 
the fact that the confiscation of the proceeds of crime is not listed in Article 83(1). For this 
reason, the commission argues that the confiscation of the proceeds of crime should fall 
under the umbrella labelled ‘organized crime’ which is listed in Article 83 tFEU. More 
specifically, the commission argues that existing provisions of EU rules on confiscation 
should remain in place in order to maintain a degree of harmonization with regard to 
activities that fall outside the scope of the proposed Directive.
Moreover, the confiscation issue is closely related to that of combating dirty money 
and terror financing. The commission has recently proposed a new Money Laundering 
Directive, the Fourth Money Laundering Directive properly so called.68 The proposed 
Directive offers a very impressive and ambitious attempt by the commission to address 
some of the criticism that it received in connection with the Third Money Laundering 
Directive, by a more elaborated scheme for risk assessment. still, the extended duty of 
risk assessment now relocated to the Member states poses the question to what extent the 
Member states are fit to do this job.
In any case, the area of procedural criminal law offers then a more positive picture of 
what is needed to improve EU criminal law.
b. DIrEctIVE OF PrOcEDUrAL sAFEgUArDs AND AccEss tO 
A LAWYEr
The EU is currently very active in the field of procedural protection, which is a welcome 
development and a result of the extended competences granted by the Lisbon treaty. 
The first step in this process is Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and 
translation, which has already entered into force (though the implementation deadline 
is in 2013).69 More recent legislative initiatives are the proposal for a directive70 on the 
right to information in criminal proceedings. And the third step is the proposal for a 
directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to 
communicate upon arrest.71 These initiatives follow the roadmap for the strengthening 
of procedural rights of suspects and accused persons in criminal law proceedings 
appended to the stockholm Programme as discussed above. These instruments, based 
68 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the council on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, cOM (2013) 45 final, p. 3.
69 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the council of 20 October 2010 on the right 
to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, [2010] OJ L 280/1.
70 Ibid.
71 Proposal for a Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to 
communicate upon arrest, cOM (2001) 326 final.
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on Article 82(2) tFEU, aim to promote mutual trust in cross-border cases and represent 
an example of the EU’s emphasis on the procedural rights side of the coin instead of (as 
previously) having mostly focused on the question of enforcement of coercive measures.
Arguably, the proposed Directive on access to a lawyer is the most far-reaching of 
any piece of EU criminal law legislation in procedural criminal law thus far.72 In line 
with the mandate set out in the roadmap for the strengthening of procedural rights, 
this Directive lays down minimum requirements at EU level governing the rights of 
suspected and accused persons and their right to have access to a lawyer. It thus promotes 
application of the charter, and in particular Articles 6, 47 and 48 therein, by building 
upon Article 6 EcHr and the notion of a fair trial.73 Interestingly, the Directive points 
out that ‘Any derogation must be justified by compelling reasons pertaining to the urgent 
need to avert danger for the life or physical integrity of one or more people’. In addition, 
any derogation must comply with the principle of proportionality, which implies that 
the competent authority must always choose the alternative that least restricts the right 
of access to a lawyer and must limit the duration of the restriction as much as possible. 
Furthermore, the proposed Directive states that in accordance with EcHr case law, no 
derogation may be based exclusively on the type or seriousness of the offence, and any 
decision to derogate requires a case-by-case assessment by the competent authority.
It should also be mentioned that the charter grants exceptions to the rule of absolute 
fundamental rights protection. It is to be hoped that this is how the derogation granted 
in Article 52 of the charter of Fundamental rights is to be interpreted in the future as 
well. According to this provision, Member states can derogate from charter obligations 
on the basis of what is proportionate. Therefore, in criminal law it seems that what is 
needed here is a strict application of proportionality.
The latest step in the direction of establishing a European framework for the 
protection of the victim is the proposed Directive on the protection of the victim.74 This 
proposal aims to ensure that the wide ranging needs of victims of crime, which cut across 
a number of other EU policies, are respected and met. In particular, the protection of 
victims’ rights is an essential part of a range of EU policies and/or instruments related to 
human trafficking, sexual abuse and the sexual exploitation of children, violence against 
women, terrorism, organized crime, and the enforcement of road traffic offences. It has 
been on the agenda of the council of Europe, the commission and the Parliament since 
the 1970s. but until recently with the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, there was no 
72 see the discussion in House of Lords, 30th Report, The European Union’s policy on criminal procedure, 
30th report session 2010–2012.
73 On the notion of a fair trial see e.g. A. Ashworth et al., Human Rights and Criminal Justice (Thomson 
sweet & Maxwell, London 2007).
74 Proposal for Directive on establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime, cOM (2011) 275 final, adopted by council, 4 Oct. 2012; Directive 2012/29/EU, OJ 
L315/57.
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legislative competence at the supranational level in this area. Instead the EU produced a 
Framework Decision partly dealing with the issue.75
However, the Framework Decision for the protection of victims applies only to 
witnesses or parties to the process. With regard to the implementation aspect it has 
furthermore been pointed out that it left too much discretion to the Member states and 
that it was therefore difficult to assess the exact implications of this Framework Decision.76 
The stockholm Programme sought to remedy this by linking the need for the protection 
of the victim with the general wave of increased participation of the citizens. The current 
‘weak’ status of the victim in EU law is perhaps confirmed by the recent cases of Gueye 
and Sanchez concerning the interpretation of Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA on the 
protection of the victim.77 In these cases the court of Justice stated that not only did this 
Framework Decision leave a large margin of appreciation to the Member states in their 
implementation but also that the Framework Decision does not impose any obligation 
on Member states to ensure that victims will be treated in a manner equivalent to that 
of a party to proceedings. Thus, the proposed Directive on the protection of the victim 
would represent an important symbolic gesture of the EU on the global criminal justice 
stage.78
§6. cONcLUsION – EU crIMINAL LAW AND tHE 
DEcONstrUctION OF tHE AFsJ
The phenomenon of EU criminal law has largely taken shape in the last decade, starting 
with the anti-terrorist measures adopted in the wake of 9/11, and travelling into the hard 
core EU constitutional law landscape. As explained above, much of this development 
has been centred on the principle of effectiveness, the Environmental Crimes case being 
the trendsetter. One would have thought that the legal setting post-Lisbon would have 
matured now and that the use of the effectiveness principle was not as urgent. Yet the 
recent cases of Melloni and Da Silva Jorge prove otherwise, emphasizing the importance 
of the full effectiveness of EU criminal law. Hence, the effectiveness of EU law is still a 
strong principle.
It seems clear that EU criminal law will become an important testing field for the 
management and balancing of a multi-speed Europe. Its harmonization programme, 
built around the possibilities for Member states to apply an emergency brake, represents 
75 council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings, [2001] OJ L 82/1.
76 Ibid.
77 case c-483/09 and c-1/10 Gueye and Sanchez, Judgment of 15 september 2011, not yet reported; case 
c-507/10 Criminal proceedings against X, Judgment of 21 December 2011, not yet reported.
78 Discussed further in, E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘recent Developments in the Area of substantive and Procedural 
EU criminal law: challenges and Possibilities’, in M. bergstrom and A. cornell, EU Criminal law and 
Police Cooperation, Swedish Studies in EU law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2013, forthcoming).
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an interesting case of flexibility. It is as yet unclear what role, if any, effectiveness will 
play here. Nevertheless, the opt-outs and opt-ins by the UK and Ireland as well as the 
restrictive approach as adopted by Denmark (in saying no to EU criminal law in its 
entirety), pose difficulties in the future and promise a court-led era as to the practical 
meaning of these opt-outs. The added value of the charter will largely depend on the 
willingness of the court to interpret the wording ‘implementation of EU law’ in a liberal 
fashion. Irrespective of this, it serves as an important benchmark in the discussion on 
EU criminal law and the development of a consistent regime in this area.
For all these reasons, it seems pertinent to finish with the same conclusion as the 
present author wrote in the Maastricht Journal in 2007, just at the beginning of the 
development of EU criminal law. back then I concluded that the EU was very much in 
need of a constitutional compass and that this compass also had to be working. In 2013 
the EU is still very much in need of such a constitutional compass.79 but unlike then, 
this compass needs not only to be working but also the super power of sidestepping the 
EU-Hegelian owl of Minerva who spreads it wings at dawn. It is perhaps a truth in EU 
integration that reality is best understood in hindsight, and as the EU project continues 
to evolve, we will only truly understand it retroactively.80 Yet the AFsJ and EU criminal 
law offers an example of where it, for once, would be better to pile up the facts before 
hitting the (wrong) target.
79 E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘recent Developments in European criminal Law’, 15 MJ 1 (2007).
80 P.F. Kjaer, ‘The Metamorphosis of the Functional synthesis: A continental European Perspective on 
governance, Law and the Political in the transnational space’, 2 Wisconsin Law Review (2010), p. 489–
533.
